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ABSTRACT
This contribution analyses the role of taxation in the constitution of authority
in the conflict-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where
a multitude of authorities alternately compete and collude over the right
to extract resources. Taxation ranges from simple plunder, to protection
rackets, to the material reciprocation of the recognition of rights. Focusing
on the taxation practices of armed groups, the article argues that taxation is at
the core of armed groups’ production of public authority and citizenship, and
that their modes of taxation are based on long-standing registers of authority
and practices of rule that originate in the colonial era. In particular, the
article shows that by appealing to both local customary and national forms
of political community and citizenship, armed groups are able to assume
public authority to tax civilians. However, their public authority may be
undermined by their tendency to reproduce a historical pattern in which
authorities forcefully impose a heavy tax burden, while providing limited
public goods and services in return.
INTRODUCTION
State collapse, followed by two decades of trans-scalar armed conflict, has
turned the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hence-
forth: the Congo) into a deeply fragmented political space in which a wide
range of actors including state officials, armed groups, customary chiefs,
church leaders, civil society members and international organizations com-
pete to assume public authority over people and resources. Authority mirrors
The authors would like to thank the editors of the Rule and Rupture special issue, as well as Judith
Verweijen, David Newbury and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of
this article. This research was funded by the Justice and Security Research Programme, a DfID-
supported international research consortium (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/); a PhD scholarship from
the Institute of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University and the Danish Institute for
International Studies; and a PhD studentship from the Department of International Development
of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Development and Change 47(6): 1434–1456. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12275
C© 2016 International Institute of Social Studies.
Taxation and Public Authority in Eastern Congo 1435
the ebbs and flows of these power struggles as different actors gain and lose
the capacity to institute order.
Taxation is a pivotal part of these struggles to assume public authority.
Until recently the view on taxation in the Congo was dominated by the
‘greed’ literature of the early 2000s, which largely framed taxation during
conflict as predatory and violent.1 However, more recent ethnographic stud-
ies which focus on how authority and order are produced in conflict zones
have shown that the social relations of taxation are far more complex, am-
biguous, ordered and reciprocal than the ‘greed’ literature claims (Garrett
et al., 2009; Laudati, 2013; Raeymaekers, 2010; Sanchez de la Sierra, 2015;
Schouten, 2013; Titeca, 2011; Verweijen, 2013). Most often, these relations
involve the provision of goods in exchange for resource extraction. These
fiscal bargains are predominantly, though not exclusively, centred around
the provision of protection, security and justice, particularly when armed ac-
tors are involved. These taxation-for-protection arrangements may involve
the protection of individuals, of property, of infrastructure and of economic
activity and production, with security provided either on an individual basis
as ‘private protection’ or as a more public good.
While this recent literature has offered rich insights into the novel forms
of taxation and order making that emerge in conflict zones, it has rarely
focused on how long-term historical processes shape contemporary prac-
tices.2 In this contribution, we attempt to fill this gap by tracing the his-
torical antecedents of the modes of taxation that armed groups deploy in
eastern Congo. Drawing on both historical material and field research in
the neighbouring territories of Kalehe (South Kivu) and Walikale (North
Kivu) we argue, first, that taxation is at the core of armed groups’ produc-
tion of public authority and citizenship and, second, that taxation practices
are strongly conditioned by institutionalized registers of authority and prac-
tices of order making. To acknowledge the complex relations of authority
of which taxation is a part, we define taxation broadly as the obligation
to contribute resources (money, goods or labour) to a public authority
in return for services and goods. By ‘public authority’ we mean a form
of authority which is built on a modicum of mutual recognition between
rulers and ruled, and distinct from purely personal relations (Lund, 2006:
678).
Contrary to pillaged resources, taxes not only constitute resources for
power holders; they also entail processes of recognition of the authority
1. According to this theory it is ‘easy’ for ‘greedy’ armed groups to impose predatory taxation
on primary commodities during ‘civil war’ (e.g. Berdal and Malone, 2000; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; de Soysa, 2000).
2. But see the literature on vigilantism (Heald, 2006;Meagher, 2007; Pratten, 2008; Pratten and
Sen, 2007), which pays particular attention to tracing the organizational and institutional
histories of contemporary forms of non-state security provision. See also Raeymaekers
(2014).
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of those power holders, as well as the citizenship (or membership) of the
populace in a political community (ibid.: 696; see also Lund’s Introduc-
tion to this issue). Taxation thus enmeshes people in a web of generalized
reciprocity based on mutual obligations and rights. In this sense, taxation
epitomizes the social contract between authorities and citizens of a given
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Martin et al., 2009). It is important
to emphasize, however, that taxation establishes unequal relations of power
and exchange between people. These are based on certain normalized un-
derstandings of community, order, duty and citizenship, which, if necessary,
are secured by force. As we show, taxation in eastern Congo is embedded
in historically contingent practices and discourses of authority, and in par-
ticular in a ‘language of stateness’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001: 8). This
‘language of stateness’ was introduced through colonization and includes
the principle of territorial sovereignty, often articulated in nationalist and
legal discourse; the production of knowledge about the people living on
this territory through censuses and other bureaucratic instruments; and the
accumulation of resources through taxation and various forms of disposses-
sion. Importantly, public signs, rituals and spectacles connect all of these
operations to the very idea of the state.
In spite of the current fragmentation of authority in eastern Congo, the
political order remains deeply anchored in a ‘language of stateness’. It con-
tinues to resonatewith the social imaginaries of public order and is reinvented
by state as well as non-state actors (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014; Titeca
and De Herdt, 2011). We suggest that the taxation practices of armed groups
in eastern Congo draw on this language of stateness. In particular, we suggest
that they evoke local customary and national territorial understandings of
citizenship and political community, in order to assume public authority and
to tax populations. This is not to say that taxation practices have remained the
same since colonialism. Rather it is argued that taxation practices of armed
groups — consciously or unconsciously — draw upon, mobilize, evoke and
perform the language of stateness when they tax people.
The article focuses on the territories of Kalehe andWalikale.3 Both territo-
ries have witnessed two decades of armed group proliferation and increased
competition over local power, leading to a deeply fragmented political space
and constant competition over public authority. Our analysis is based on
long-term fieldwork in the area (1997–2015) where we have carried out
numerous interviews with a wide range of respondents, including custom-
ary authorities; juridical and security authorities such as police agents, ter-
ritorial administrators, soldiers, intelligence agents and court clerks; but
3. While our findings are obviously empirically circumscribed, our conceptual contribution
has a wider reach. We focus on the Batembo and Bahavu areas of Kalehe and Walikale.
In Kalehe we draw on field research in the mainly Batembo areas of Kalima, Mubuku, and
Buloho, and the mainly Bahavu area of Mbinga-Sud. In Walikale we draw on fieldwork
carried out in the mainly Batembo area of Walowa-Loanda.
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also representatives of armed groups, petty traders, farmers, civil society
representatives, NGO workers, priests, health workers, miners, journalists,
craftsmen, educators, students and peddlers.
The article starts by analysing colonial practices of taxation, outlining the
taxation regime of the Congo Free State (CFS). Attention then turns to the
period since the take-over of the Belgian state, with a focus on the Kalehe
and Walikale area, including an examination of taxation practices during
the Mobutu era. The following section focuses on the taxation practices
that emerged during the Congolese Wars through the study of two Mai-Mai
groups fromKalehe: theMai-Mai of General Padiri and theMai-Mai Kalehe.
The final section looks at today’s taxation practices based on a study of the
Mai-Mai Kifuafua from Walowa-Loanda in Walikale.
COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC AND
POWER RELATIONS
Prior to colonial penetration, the social landscape in Kalehe and Walikale
consisted of an assortment of interconnected polities, which straddled two
vast cultural areas. To the west were the forest cultures of the Congo Basin,
such as the Batembo and the Banyanga, where people lived in small, inde-
pendent but highly interactive polities, and to the east, the more centralized
highland states of the inter-lacustrine cultures, such as theBahavu (Biebuyck,
1957; Newbury, 1991: 43–7; Newbury, 2009: 2–3).4 In the polities of the
forest cultures a high degree of individual mobility meant that contacts
among different groups were frequent, but not enduring. Therefore, ideas
and material items diffused extensively and political entities were never
territorially bound. Executive power was dispersed among many groups,
individuals and families. Although internally differentiated, these groups
acted together. They arrived at decisions communally and performed their
functions communally. Importantly, therefore, status was defined more by
ritual function and proximity to royal status than by descent. This meant that
a very high proportion of families were directly tied to the ritual or executive
complex of a given polity (Newbury, 1991: 51–2). In both of these cultural
areas, tributes were part of a complex system of social exchange and mu-
tual responsibility between chiefs and ordinary people. These tributes were
4. This term denotes an ensemble of similar cultures stretching from Lake Albert, the Victoria
Nile and Lake Victoria, in the north and east, to Lake Edward and the Mitumba Mountains
(west of Lake Kivu) in the west, and to Burundi and Buha (in Tanzania, just south of
Burundi) in the south. Though heterogeneous, these cultures were characterized by highly
centralized political organizations, a high degree of social differentiation within individual
polities, andmixed economies based on cattle keeping and seed agriculture (Newbury, 1991:
330–1).
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integral to the recognition of the legitimacy of royal authority and vital for
establishing social cohesion and political order.5
The colonial language of stateness and logic of state making brought a
wholly different understanding of political space, order and methods of rule
to the Congo. Science, modern technology, bureaucracy, law, coercion and
Christian morality were deployed to bring order and certainty to what was
described as a dark and wild place (Hoffmann, 2014: 63). Violence and
resource extraction marked the colonial state during the CFS period under
Leopoldian rule (1885–1908). To ensure its fiscal viability, this vast colony
was divided into the distinct categories of terres indige`nes (native land) and
terres vacantes (vacant land), and all vacant land was assigned to the state
for exploitation.6
This scission of the colonial territory also inaugurated two distinct politico-
legal spheres: the civil society of the white citizenry and the tribe of the
native subjects (cf. Mamdani, 1996). The natives were subjected to indi-
rect rule through so-called chefs coutumiers (customary chiefs), who were
embedded into the colonial administration as early as 1886 (Hoffmann,
2014: 121). However, during the CFS period many of these chiefs were
former soldiers of the colonial army or freed slaves, rather than custom-
ary authorities which had existed previously (Northrup, 1988: 40). In 1891
these chiefs became even further integrated in the colonial government
apparatus with the creation of the institution of the chefferie (chiefdom),
which ostensibly regrouped natives belonging to the same ‘ethnic type’
within the ‘traditional’ boundaries of their tribal homelands. In reality, how-
ever, their populations remained highly heterogeneous. In this way, the
notion of an ethnic territory (chiefdom) became embedded in a language of
stateness.
The violent inclusion of the natives into the new state and the global
economy profoundly disturbed the old system of tributes. The entire state-
making project rested on the principle that the colonized should bear the cost
of their own government and the mission to civilize them. The CFS imposed
a regime of taxes on the natives to be paid either in natural commodities,
notably ivory and rubber, or in corve´es (labour services). Lacking man-
power, resources, infrastructure and legitimacy, the CFS to a large extent
outsourced the extraction of resources to the ‘customary chiefs’. Thus, a law
of 1891 defining the role of native chiefs required that at the certification and
investiture of each African chief a list would be made of these prestations
5. For more details, see Biebuyck (1966) and Newbury (1991).
6. The delimitation of the native lands severely underestimated the land actually in use by
the natives. After vigorous protests in Europe the vacant land was subdivided into three
different zones in 1892: one free zone open to commercial exploitation, one zone to ensure
the economic viability of the state, and a Domain prive´ reserved for the state (De Clerck,
2004: 255).
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(services) to be furnished to the state.7 These were in addition to the tributes
natives already paid to chiefs. While the prestationswere framed as taxation
by the colonizers,8 there was no social contract between the colonizers and
natives — except between the colonizers and their local allies. This form
of sedentary plunder was particularly widespread in the western parts of the
territory, where the colonizers had first penetrated and created a vast plan-
tation economy based on rubber exploitation. The extent to which the CFS
depended on pillaged resources acquired through forced labour is expressed
in the export value of rubber compared to other products. Between 1896 and
1901 its relative value rose from 53 per cent to 87 per cent of the total value
of exports (Ndaywel e` Nziem, 1998: 332).
Violence was an omnipresent companion of colonial resource extraction
in the CFS.9 Rape, torture, whipping, hostage taking, mutilation, surprise
raids and summary executions underpinned the prestations system (Harms,
1983; Ngbwapkwa, 1993; Roes, 2010; Vellut, 1984). On the lands owned
by the state this was approved by an unpublished decree from 1892 that
authorized the secretary of the state ‘to take whatever measures he regards
useful or necessary to ensure the exploitation’ (Northrup, 1988: 41).
In the eastern part of the CFS, where Kalehe and Walikale are situ-
ated, a different form of resource plunder was predominant. The area cor-
responded to the zone of influence of Zanzibari slave traders, the major
adversaries of the CFS. During the war against the Zanzibari (1892–5),
colonial forces lived mainly off the land, carrying out raids for food, slaves
and war booty wherever they passed (Ndaywel e` Nziem, 1998: 284–5;
Roes, 2010: 635; Vellut, 1984). Following the defeat of the Zanzibari, the
Europeans took over the institutions, personnel and policies left behind
by the Zanzibari traders.10 The local intermediaries of the Zanzibari be-
came vital allies of the CFS: they provided food provisions and porters,
much as they had done for their former Zanzibari masters. In 1893, a spe-
cial ‘taxation’ regime, which made more extensive demands for porter-
age, ivory and rubber on natives, was put in place in eastern Congo to
cover the expenses of the war against the Zanzibari. The obligations un-
der this heading exceeded all others in their magnitude and onerousness
(Northrup, 1988: 42).
7. Decree: ‘Chefs indige`nes – Investiture’, Art. 4. Bulletin Officielle de l’E´tat Inde´pendant du
Congo, 7th year, Nr. 10, October 1891: 259–61.
8. In the official Encyclope´die du Congo Belge, native taxes were framed as a contribution to
the common expenses and a gesture of allegiance to the government (Gille, 1951: 737).
9. While this could be said of all the colonial states in Africa (Mbembe, 2001), the CFS became
notorious for it.
10. In 1893, Governor General The´ophile Wahis described the regime in eastern Congo as
follows: ‘[it is] in short just about what had been created by the Arabs. The division of
territory is what they had established. The personnel, who occupy the regions here and
there, are those whom they sent here’ (quoted in Northrup, 1988: 43).
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During these tumultuous times, African political institutions struggled to
adapt. Chiefs were caught in a cruel dilemma. They had to protect their
peoples as much as possible but at the same time they also had to satisfy
the state’s demands for labour and contributions, or run the risk of being
replaced by chiefs picked by the government, who were more willing to do
the bidding of the colonial masters.
TAXATION, COERCION AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CITIZENSHIP
The Belgian colonial state (1908–60) has often been portrayed as a hege-
monic Behemoth, which, supported by the moral authority of the Church
and the capital of large enterprises, imposed a new ruling structure (e.g.
Young, 1965). However, natives did play significant roles in the profound
transformation of local societies that resulted from European penetration.
In the Kivu region, for example, circumstances meant that there was scope
for natives to shape the situation to their advantage. First, the coloniz-
ers were mainly preoccupied with defending the state’s border to the east
against German and British imperial interests.11 As a result, colonial pres-
ence was limited to a series of forts erected on the border to defend it.
Second, due to a lack of transport infrastructure, resources and person-
nel, the colonizers were dependent on native chiefs to provide food sup-
plies,12 labour and building materials. Third, because army mutineers held
out in the area (Njangu, 1973), Kivu was the last region to be explored and
‘pacified’.13
Certain local elites seized the opportunity to strengthen their position
in local power struggles by collaborating with the new colonial actors.
By mobilizing the labour of their subjects these local elites provided the
colonizers with the resources they needed, and in return received protection
and recognition from the colonial government. However, if the tenuous
position of the state implied increased scope for local resistance and room
for manoeuvre for native elites, it also meant that the colonizers had to rely
on coercion, which remained integral to ‘taxation’. Chiefs and communities
who refused to provide the demanded contributions and corve´e labour found
themselves targeted by police and military operations (Bishikwabo, 1984).
Under these conditions one of the most important benefits of collaboration
for local elites and their populations was simply to avoid being subjected to
11. For more details on this imperial controversy, which nearly triggered a new scramble for
Africa in 1894, see Louis (1963).
12. The Europeans relied on native food supplies to sustain the colonial project across the colony
since they did not produce food themselves (Ndaywel e` Nziem, 1998: 339).
13. Lake Kivu itself was not ‘discovered’ until 16 June 1894 by the expedition of the German
explorer Count von Go¨tzen.
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the repressive measures of the colonial authorities. In this respect, colonial
taxation practices ushered in new taxation-for-protection arrangements.
This dynamic was also at play in Kalehe, where two Bahavu chiefs who
ruled the lakeside area (Lushombo andBiglimani) collaboratedwith the colo-
nial authorities. Both chiefs provided much-needed supplies and achieved
official recognition from the colonial authorities (Hoffmann, 2014: 159;
Shanyungu, 1976: 51–2). By contrast, in the forested regions, reported
to be rich in ivory and rubber, the colonizers met armed resistance from
local chiefs and populations who refused to provide contributions to the
Europeans. To subdue these areas, military expeditions were carried out
against insurgent chiefs and their followers in 1911–12, resulting in the
deaths of more than 250 natives. However, these campaigns failed to bring
these regions fully under colonial control (Hoffmann, 2014: 161–6). The
outbreak of World War I further reinforced the coercive aspect of resource
extraction in the region. During the war, the colonial army of Belgian Congo
invaded German-held Ruanda-Urundi. Scores of people from Kalehe and
Walikale died from disease and exhaustion while carrying supplies and
munitions to the front (ibid.).
The end of World War I signalled the replacement of public authority and
resource extraction carried out primarily through force, by authority of an
increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic nature aiming to develop (mettre
en valeur) the colony in eastern Congo. However, the changes were not
immediately felt in most Batembo areas, where the population refused to
accept colonial sovereignty. As a result, certain parts remained subject to
military rule until 1919–20 (ibid.).
In the long run, the transition to amore technocratic native policy involved
momentous changes. The introduction of a head tax, the amalgamation of
smaller chieftaincies, the creation of native courts, and the relocation of
different populations served to create more hierarchical systems of rule
revolving around the control of territory and population. This led to the
concentration of authority and resources in the hands of the chiefs and their
supporters at the local level. This, in turn, allowed for a more efficient
imposition of order and resource extraction (Newbury and Newbury, 1982).
The measures were introduced over time and met with different kinds of
obstacles.
For example, when the amalgamation of small, so-called unsustainable
chieftaincies into bigger ones was implemented in the 1920s,14 it led to the
creation of a new and largeBuhavu chiefdom inKalehe and the incorporation
of several previously independent chiefdoms. The chiefdom was ruled by a
new figure of authority: the grand chef of the Bahavu, Bahole, who was the
successor of Lushombo. Bahole thus became the ruler over a new territorial
14. Ministe`re des Colonies, Section d’Affaires Indige`nes et Main d’Oeuvre. Folder: 1640-9205.
Circular Nr. 505, signed by Minister of Colonies Louis Franck. Retrieved from the archive
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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entity, which stretched into the eastern edge of the equatorial rainforest.
Moreover, he was supposed to work according to one set of customary
rules, to be enforced by the newly created native courts. While the new
territory was defined mono-ethnically by the colonial authorities, in reality
its populations were highly heterogeneous.
The creation of the Buhavu chiefdom caused resentment and resistance
among the Batembowho refused to respect the grand chef as a public author-
ity. Taxation was a major bone of contention and several Batembo chiefs
refused to pay taxes to Bahole (Hoffmann, 2014: 186). As the territorial
administrator noted:
The populations [of Kalima] do not accept any other authority than the mubutetu chief. The
influence and prestige of the chief of the musibura [Bahole] is almost nil; tribute was brought
to him for the first time in 1934, after an energetic and direct pressure by the European
administration. The emissaries that the Mwami have sent to this province have been very
badly received.15
In 1934, in order to better estimate the number of taxable subjects among
the Batembo, the colonial authorities attempted to regroup the populations
in villages along roads. This proved equally difficult, as the Batembo con-
tinuously evaded and deceived colonial agents.16 As the annual report of
the Bahavu chiefdom recorded in 1932: ‘[t]he desire to evade any authority
has pushed these natives to construct huts beyond any reach. If a path leads
to a village it will be moved to a neighbouring mountain. If we arrive in
this village, only two or three old women are left’.17 Throughout the colo-
nial era, the colonial authorities were frustrated by what they saw as the
unfavourable attitude of the Batembo towards civilization, earning them a
reputation as exceptionally savage. This prejudice denied the Batembo the
right to an independent chiefdom, and thus independent ethnic citizenship,
with the exception of the small chiefdom of Buloho, which was recognized
in 1945.
While the taxation regime was met with resistance, it also created a new
kind of social contract revolving around the ‘imagined community’ of the
ethnic group. In 1933, the colonial authorities introduced a caisse (treasury)
in the chieftaincies. The caisse was a public fund which centralized the
resources of the chiefdom. These resources were earmarked to contribute to
covering the administration of the chiefdom. In this way a new kind of fiscal
15. J.M. Derscheid Collection, University of Florida Digital Collections: ‘Bahavu. Province
du Karima (Kalima des documents administratifs). Notes A. Braun. January 1935’.
http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00002627/00001?search=karima
16. Ministe`re des Colonies. Section d’Affaires Indige`nes et Main d’Oeuvre. Folder: 82. ‘Com-
mentaires du Commissaire de District du Kivu sur le rapport annuel de 1934 du territoire
des Bahavu’. Retrieved from the archive of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17. Ministe`re desColonies. Section d’Affaires Indige`nes etMain d’Oeuvre. Folder: 82. ‘Rapport
annuel. Territoire des Bahavu de 1932’. Retrieved from the archive of the Belgian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
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bargain emerged whereby members of the chiefdom received something in
return for the resources they paid to the chief. These resources were neither
a tribute to the ‘chief’ nor an obligatory contribution imposed by a violent
external force. Instead they were a contribution to the ‘ethnic community’,
as a territorially bounded imagined community. In this way taxation helped
to create ethnic forms of citizenship.
Ultimately, the subjugation of the Batembo to the Bahavu chief con-
tributed to the growth of a Batembo political identity and community. Colo-
nial reports indicate that in the Batembo areas, from the mid-1930s onwards,
censuses were conducted, taxes paid, budgets made, labour conscripted, na-
tive courts created, money introduced, villages regrouped, and roads and
buildings constructed. In short, even in Batembo areas a more bureaucratic
language of stateness gradually took hold (cf. Hoffmann, 2014). In 1945,
Batembo leaders started formulating claims for a separate Batembo terri-
tory18 and by 1956 Batembo leaders had created the ‘ethnic’ associations
— the Union d’Entreaide Batembo — all signs that a new kind of Batembo
territorial political identity was emerging.
SCARCITY, EXTORTION AND THE RUPTURE OF THE FISCAL BARGAIN
Independence brought sudden and dramatic changes to eastern Congo even
if the nature of the state and its forms of taxationwere only partially reformed
during decolonization. Certain core features of the colonial taxation regime
remained. The chiefs continued to collect the head tax, for which the vast
majority of the population in the rural areas was liable.19 Rural residents
also still paid taxes both to the central state and to the chiefdoms, although
they received few public services and goods in return. Furthermore, coercion
remained integral to taxation.
However, under Mobutu, there was an important change in the language
of stateness. TheMobutu regime consciously set out to turn the colonial state
into a nation state, rather than a collection of tribes haphazardly brought to-
gether by colonial intervention. Taxes paid to the state were now framed as
a contribution to the imagined community of the Zairian nation state rather
than to an externally imposed colonial state. The state- and nation-building
project of the Mobutu regime combined the colonial model of authoritari-
anism and centralized control with unitary nationalist discourse, articulated
in the successive doctrines of ‘authentic Zairian nationalism’, ‘authenticity’
and ‘Mobutism’. It stressed order, control, discipline and work, in particular,
18. Interview, village chief, 28 September 2011,Bulambika; Interview,Councillor to the Provin-
cial Assembly of South Kivu, ca. November 2012, Bukavu.
19. The head tax also constituted the main source of revenue for the chieftaincies, usually
around 50 per cent. The chieftaincies were allowed to keep 50 per cent of those taxes: the
rest were sent to the zone and to the central state (Callaghy, 1984: 370).
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as a move away from the disorder of the tumultuous first five years of in-
dependence, which were marked by war and political uncertainty. The duty
of the citizens was to obey and support the new ruler, who was presented
as the embodiment of the nation. Paying taxes and working conscientiously
were framed as the primary duties of the citizenry vis-a`-vis the sovereign
(Callaghy, 1984: 322–3).
The regime’s legitimacy began to crumble when its provision of public
goods declined drastically following the virtual collapse of the state econ-
omy in the mid-1970s, in the wake of the sharp drop in copper prices of 1973
and the effects of patrimonial rule.20 While the regime’s provision of public
goods and the economic conditions of most Zaı¨rois declined, the official and
unofficial fiscal burden increased,21 and compulsory unpaid civicwork called
salongowas introduced to instil a sense of civic education and to compensate
for dwindling government resources (Callaghy 1984: 299–303). Even if this
was unevenly imposed — and sometimes hardly imposed at all — it still
echoed the despised colonial practice of corve´e labour. In practice, salongo
was often used for private purposes by authorities. Fairhead (1992) provides
an illustrative example from the chieftaincy of Bwisha in North Kivu from
the late 1980s. Salongo was organized by the customary authorities, usually
the village chief and the president of the state party’s so-called comite´
de base (grassroots committee). Common tasks included cultivating the
fields of customary authorities, and building and maintaining their houses.
On rare occasions, the work went towards constructing roads or to social
infrastructure such as schools and clinics. Superiors justified their private
use of community labour by claiming that it was compensation for unpaid
posts.
With the deepening economic decline, which had a dramatic effect on
the core foundations of patrimonial rule, taxation became further informal-
ized, privatized and decentred. As Schatzberg has shown, the combination
of rampant insecurity among state agents, who never knew how long they
would be able to keep their positions, and the ‘overwhelming condition of
economic scarcity’, led them to accumulate as many resources as rapidly as
they could by extracting them from those in inferior positions (Schatzberg,
1980: 184). The effect of these developments was increased scarcity and
insecurity among ‘tax-payers’. The security forces in particular became a
‘free-floating source of insecurity’ (Schatzberg, 1988: 70).22 Roads through-
out the country were peppered with roadblocks erected by army units, state
20. For instance, the Mobutu regime’s allocation of resources to health and education dropped
from 17.5 per cent in 1972 to 2.1 per cent in 1992.
21. Although such numbers should be taken with extreme caution, scholars estimated the fiscal
burden on rural populations to have been as high as 50 per cent, not including bribes and
other illegal forms of extortion (Callaghy, 1984: 370; Young and Turner, 1985: 96)
22. Also increasing the total fiscal burden on Congolese citizens was the fact that it was common
practice for tax collectors and other officials to simply keep a portion for themselves
(Schatzberg, 1988: 195).
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party youth groups, or local police conducting ope´rations de rattisage (search
and sweep operations), which were supposedly intended to haul in illegals
but were yet another form of extraction (Callaghy, 1984: 288–90; Fairhead,
1992: 22–3). These practices of extortive resource extraction undermined the
legitimacy of local authorities, including those in the Kivu region (Callaghy,
1984; Newbury, 1984). As taxation became little more than thinly-disguised
predation, people were mobilized to protest this breach of the social con-
tract with authorities. Catharine Newbury provides a striking example from
Buloho chiefdom in Kalehe. Here, in 1982, a group of cassava-producing
women protested against the multiplication of irregular taxes by state and
customary officials: over the 10 km to the market, three different levies
were imposed at stream crossings where barriers could not be evaded. The
women were driven to their unprecedented act of protest because of the
declining terms of the cassava trade and because the new taxes provided
nothing in return (Newbury, 1984: 48). By claiming the right to some-
thing in return for payment, they maintained that what they paid was tax
rather than extortion money. One woman expressed her dissatisfaction as
follows:
We would like to know what is being done with the money collected for this tax. . . . In this
region there is no road, no bridge, nor even a market like that at Bulambika. So what projects
are being financed by this money? These thirty makuta which [the chieftdom] has added to
the twenty makuta — what do they do with this profit? (quoted in Newbury, 1984: 41)
In addition to this informalization and privatization of taxation, the socio-
economic protection provided by the customary chiefs came under stress
in 1973, when previously protected customary lands were nationalized and
made available on the market. In much of the Kivus, customary chiefs
exploited these new opportunities by selling off large tracts of customary
land to the wealthy politico-commercial, largely urban elite, of which many
were connected to the regime. This process profoundly shook the authority
of the chiefs as an increasing number of peasants — youths in particular —
found themselves excluded from its systems of socio-economic protection
(Vlassenroot and Van Acker, 2001).
In Kalehe, the increased competition for resources also had ethnic conno-
tations. For instance, Batembo leaders continued the struggle begun during
the colonial period by repeatedly seeking recognition as an independent
chiefdom (Hoffmann, 2014; Pindo, 1977). The right to taxation was integral
to these claims because, just as during the colonial era, chiefdom revenues
continued to be generated locally through fees and taxes (Callaghy, 1984:
368–9). These recurrent claims were not merely symbolic; they constituted
politico-economic claims to self-government over pivotal resources, includ-
ing taxes. As one prominent leader in Kalima expressed it:
We [did] not have chiefdom or a customary legislation which is recognized in Kinshasa —
and these Bahavu — all they did was to dominate us. They had their hands on the market
of Bunyakiri, that is, all the taxes were used in their favour, they could do that because
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of our non-recognition from Kinshasa . . . that is to say that if you are recognized by
Kinshasa then you can develop because there is going to be a fund which is destined for your
chiefdom.23
WAR, TAXATION AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY
The failed democratization process (1990–6) and the First and SecondCongo
Wars (1996–7 and 1998–2003) constituted a series of interconnected rup-
tures, which brought profound social and political changes to eastern Congo
(Tull, 2003; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). During the Congo Wars,
armed groups started proliferating and a new class of politico-military rulers
with ties to Kinshasa or to foreign regimes rose to prominence. They fought
to assume public authority over territory and populations and engaged in
complex and fluid alliances with local authorities and with international po-
litical and business interests. New networks of ‘profit, power and protection’
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004: 21) were constituted which initiated
newfiscal bargains and experimentedwith different forms of taxation that of-
ten revolved around the provision of protection. These taxes-for-protection
arrangements again were largely framed in a language of stateness, with
taxes being presented as obligatory contributions to the defence of local
ethnic communities and the nation state — the two constitutive imagined
political communities in the Congo. Furthermore, rather than introduce new
forms of taxation, the actual operation of taxation resembled forms asso-
ciated with the Congolese state. As taxation was now part of open armed
struggles for control over territory, people and resources, the coercive aspect
became more prominent, as it had been in earlier periods. As taxation be-
came part of the logic of war, it also becamemore militarized (cf. Verweijen,
2013).
These dynamics could also be observed in Walikale and Kalehe. During
the Second Congo War, these territories were part of the battleground be-
tween the Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie-
Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma, RCD-G), which controlled
the main towns and certain strategic economic areas including mining cen-
tres, and a constellation of Rwandan Hutu insurgents and local Mai-Mai
groups that held sway in the hinterlands and eventually received support
from the Congolese government. The most powerful of these Mai-Mai
groups was led by Padiri Bulenda, and was dominated by Batembo from
Kalima, Mubuku, Buloho and Waloa-Loanda. The group claimed to be an
autochthonous resistance movement defending the Congolese native ‘Ban-
tus’ from foreign invaders seeking to create a ‘Tutsi-Hima empire’ in central
Africa. It was a narrative which resonated among the ‘autochthonous’ pop-
ulations across the Kivus, not only because the racial categories which were
23. Interview, ex-Mai-Mai administrator and schoolteacher, Bukavu, 27 November 2005.
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evoked by it had been part of the language of stateness for generations
(Newbury, 1978), but also because the same population had been exposed
to brutal treatment by the RCD-G (Hoffmann, 2015; Jackson, 2006). At its
peak, the group controlled large swathes of territory in the rural Kivus. By
invoking the principle of national sovereignty, it was able to mobilize large
segments of the population to contributemonetary and in-kind taxes. Echoing
practices of theMobutu state,Mai-Mai authorities created comite´s de soutien
(support committees). These committees were organized at the village level
by customary chiefs and Mai-Mai elements to mobilize local residents to
provide food, money, labour and recruits to the Mai-Mai (Hoffmann, 2015).
Special taxation practices were developed for lucrative economic activities,
in particular mining, which came under centralized control by the group’s
military headquarters.24
Taxation was framed as a key contribution to the restoration of the ‘au-
thority of the state’.25 It was also an important element in the creation of
an elaborate administrative framework built on the model of the defunct
Congolese state. Even in its routine exercise of public authority, the group
enacted a language of stateness. Communications, regulations, licences,
travel permits, arrest orders, memos, etc. were framed in legal-bureaucratic
language and made to look as official as possible. Yet, the group also en-
acted customary registers of authority, for instance by their extensive use
of ancient healing techniques and purification rituals known as dawa. In
their local stronghold, the use of dawa techniques provided another layer of
legitimacy as it bore witness to their claim that they embodied the authentic
culture of the Batembo (for further details, see Hoffmann, 2015). The group
also cultivated support among the Batembo by claiming to fight for the old
dream of creating a Batembo territory.
While the group often resorted to violence and intimidation to obtain com-
pliance with its fiscal bargain, it also attempted to develop the areas it ruled.
It encouraged health services, schools and various other institutions to con-
tinue their activities under the group’s protection. The heavy fiscal burden
imposed on local populations was justified by the assertion that everybody
had to contribute what they could. The war, it was argued, threatened the
very survival of the Congolese nation and taxation was framed as an oblig-
atory contribution to its defence, an effort de guerre (war effort). Despite
the group’s deep roots in local society, the pressure to provide food, money
and porterage of munitions, as well as the forced recruitment of youth and
children, strained the social contract between Padiri’s Mai-Mai and the civil-
ian population. There was a certain room for manoeuvre, however: the close
24. Interview with Major Muhindo Changoco, former adjunct of General Padiri, Bagira, 14
June 2013.
25. Memorandum: ‘Me´morandum sur la participation de l’entite´ Mai-Mai a` la gestion de la tran-
sition adresse´ a` son Excellence le ge´ne´ral major Joseph Kabila, Pre´sident de la Re´publique’,
27 September 2004. Entite´ Mai-Mai/EST. Coordination des Affaires Inte´rieures. Bukavu.
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personal relations betweenMai-Mai soldiers and local residents occasionally
enabled the latter to persuade the Mai-Mai authorities to improve the terms
of the fiscal bargain by, for instance, lightening the tax burden imposed on
them, disciplining misbehaving combatants, or taking steps to improve the
security situation (Morvan, 2005).
Nevertheless, Padiri’s group had difficulties imposing its authoritarian
and centralized regime beyond its stronghold. Local branches of the group
were unhappy with the predominance of the Batembo fromKalima, Mubuku
and Buloho in the Mai-Mai movement. This led to repeated splintering of
the group, and even to confrontations between factions (Morvan, 2005). A
case in point is the Mai-Mai Kalehe.26 This group was active between 1998
and 2004 in the highlands and midlands of the Mbinga-Sud groupement
(grouping),27 in the Bahavu areas of Kalehe territory, and counted several
Bahavu among its leaders.28 Like other security forces before it, including
Mobutu’s army and other rebel groups, the group set up roadblocks, made
access to the local market subject to the payment of entry fees, and positioned
soldiers at strategic sites to tax agricultural products and forest products and
resources.29 Furthermore, in order to tax households, the group registered
the population and monitored its contributions.30 The Mai-Mai Kalehe tried
to legitimize its right to levy war taxes on the population in two ways.
Firstly, like Padiri’s Mai-Mai, it framed its combat as a defence of the nation
against foreign invaders. This security discourse found a receptive ear, not
only among the Bahavu, but also among certain Bahutu in the highlands and
midlands, who were also frustrated with RCD-G rule. Secondly, it framed
itself as a Bahavu defence force locally, which enabled it to obtain support
from a wide spectrum of influential Bahavu notables, ranging from business
operatives to customary and civil authorities and religious leaders. In this
sense, the fiscal bargain proposed by the group evoked both local and national
forms of citizenship.
Nevertheless, the group faced severe difficulties in constituting itself as
a legitimate taxing authority, for several reasons. First, the group relied
extensively on coercion of local authorities and populations to impose its
rule and levy taxes, while providing few public goods in return. Second, there
26. The Mai-Mai Kalehe was formed by Major Muhindo Changoco, a former adjunct of Padiri
in Bunyakiri who had broken away from Padiri’s group to form his own, basing itself in
the Southern Highlands of Kalehe around the town of Katasomwa. From 1997 to 1998, the
group created strong ties with the Local Defence Forces of Lemera and Kasheke under the
leadership of Cisayura, eventually merging forces to form the Mai-Mai Kalehe.
27. In Congolese legislation, a groupement is a sub-division of a chiefdom or a sector. The
groupement is in turn sub-divided into localite´s (localities, which are sometimes referred to
as villages [villages]).
28. Jean Paul Eneondo Sido and Cisayura Bienvenue were natives of the localite´ of Kasheke in
Mbinga Sud; Major Muhindo Changoco had both Havu and Tembo origins.
29. Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Cisayura, Kavumu, June 2013.
30. Interview, Jacques Nyalakasi, executive secretary of the Mai-Mai Kalehe, Bagira, June
2013.
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was a deep-seated antagonism andmistrust between theMai-Mai Kalehe and
their supporters, on the one hand, and the customary Bahavu authorities and
their supporters on the other. This was largely because the local customary
Bahavu authorities had a history of collaboration with the RCD-G; the
customary chef de localite (village chief) of Lemera had to be coerced into
compliance.31 Third, its link with Padiri’s group and its self-definition as a
Mai-Mai group meant that many Bahavu saw it as a Batembo project, which
had no right to rule and impose taxes in a Bahavu area.32 The association
of the group with the Batembo was reinforced by its engagement with the
dawa. These practices were seen as ‘something of the Tembo, something
of the Rega, but not the Havu’.33 Other important reasons for its lack of
legitimacy were the favouritism34 that the group displayed towards friends
and family members and its corrupt practices of justice. Thus, while the
Mai-Mai Kalehe’s struggle against RCD-G rule was generally recognized as
legitimate, it was not enough to keep people content with its fiscal bargain.35
ARMED GROUPS AND TAXATION IN THE POST-SETTLEMENT ERA
The SecondCongoleseWar endedwith an inclusive peace agreement, signed
inDecember 2002.A transition process followed, leading to democratic elec-
tions in 2006 and the electoral victory of Joseph Kabila. However, the slow
return of state authorities to rebel-held areas in Kalehe and Walikale did not
significantly alter taxation regimes and practices. Severely under-resourced
local administrators, customary chiefs and militarized security services con-
tinued to rely on (militarized) strategies of resource extraction. By and large,
these were considered as harassment by the local population, but in some
cases they were seen as taxes which provided a modicum of security in
return. This was the case with some of the roadblocks set up in mid-2010,
to deter attacks by bandits and rebels who were targeting buses and trucks
transporting goods. In the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, which was regularly
frequented by bandits targeting vehicles, the roadblock erected by the army
was welcomed by the population and was experienced as a public security
service providing protection. Similarly, the customary authorities of Buloho
chiefdom successfully approached the army to deploy troops to secure the
road connecting the main town of the chiefdom, Maibano, to the main mar-
ket in Bulambika. The road was the economic lifeline of Buloho and even
though road users had to pay the troops, this was generally accepted because
31. Interview, village chief of Lemera, October 2012.
32. Interview, village chief of Kasheke, Kasheke, 8 November 2012.
33. Interview, sub-village chief of Nyamutwe, 12 November 2012.
34. Interview, village chief of Kasheke, 8 November 2012.
35. Interview, village chief of Kasheke, 8 November 2012; interview, Lieutenant Colonel
Cisayura, Mai-Mai Kalehe 21 June 2013.
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petty traders were protected against attacks from the mainly Rwandan Hutu
rebel group, Forces De´mocratiques pour la Libe´ration du Rwanda (Demo-
cratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR).36 While local citizens
expressed a certain amount of sympathy for the plight of local authorities,
however, dissatisfaction and disappointment with the government and the
overall fiscal burden remained widespread, as people did not see adequate
compensation from the taxes paid to the state.
In spite of the formal end to hostilities and the gradual return of state
services, armed groups continued to proliferate in more remote areas. These
groups were often mobilized by local political-military elites who had failed
to secure sought-after positionswithin the army and other state institutions. In
a context of ongoing insecurity and scarcity, ex-combatants andmarginalized
youth constituted an ever-present reservoir, ready to be recruited (Eriksson
Baaz and Verweijen, 2013: 12; Lamb et al., 2012: 24–7).37 While the main
protagonists, the RCD-G and Padiri’s Mai-Mai, joined the army reintegra-
tion process, in Kalehe andWalikale several groups formerly associatedwith
them remained active, including the Mai-Mai Kifuafua (Walowa-Loanda),
the Mai-Mai Kirikicho (Ziralo) and the Coalition des patriotes re´sistants
congolais (Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots, PARECO) (Ziralo, Ma-
sisi and Rutshuru). Other groups, such as the Raia Mutomboki, have since
become part of local military landscapes. Continued insecurity, ethnicized
tensions and a lack of faith in the government allowed these groups to emerge
as alternative public authorities claiming to provide security for the commu-
nity in return for the payment of contributions, presented as legitimate forms
of taxation.
A good example of such a local fiscal bargain based on the notion of
community security has developed between the Mai-Mai Kifuafua and local
residents in the remote, mostly Batembo groupement of Walowa-Loanda
situated in southern Walikale. Here, state authorities, including security
services, have been absent for a long time. This has fostered a sense of
abandonment by the state among local residents and has facilitated their
recognition of the Mai-Mai Kifuafua’s claims to be a legitimate security
force, despite its history of coercive and extractive taxation, and the fact
that it provided few tangible public goods and services in return, beyond
community defence (Vlassenroot et al., 2016). The group’s revenues are
mainly derived from the taxation of commerce and palm oil production.
For instance, it controls all the markets in the area and anyone entering
or leaving a market must pay 500 FC (about US$ 0.6). Similarly, a tax
of 2,000–3,000 FC (US$ 2.2–3.3) must be paid for each cow entering the
36. Fieldnotes, July 2010.
37. Paradoxically, policies adopted to address the proliferation of armed groups, such as army
reintegration and military operations, have further fragmented public authority to the extent
that, in 2015, an estimated 70 armed groups were operating in eastern Congo (Stearns and
Vogel, 2015; Verweijen and Wakenge, 2015).
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market, and 1,000–1,500 FC (US$ 1.1–1.6) for each goat. Manioc mills and
palm oil production are similarly taxed. The strategies that the group uses
to generate popular support are set within existing practical and symbolic
registers of authority and languages of stateness, to the extent that local
residents view the group as a ‘state within the state’. The group frames itself
as an arme´e communautaire (community army) of Walowa-Loanda and as
guarantor of Walowa-Loanda’s security. In this context, taxation is justified
as an obligation that community members owe to the community for its
security.
In contrast to the Mai-Mai Kalehe, the taxation practices of the Mai-
Mai Kifuafua are to some extent recognized as legitimate because they are
firmly anchored in the local community and because they observe certain
values and norms, which underpin the exercise of public authority and
taxation. Rather than being enforced solely by coercion, public authority
and taxation rights are subject to a high level of negotiation with customary
authorities and other local notables, who continue to receive considerable
levels of popular support. As one civil society leader put it: ‘The Mai-Mai
Kifuafua collaborate closely with the customary chiefs because people listen
to the customary chiefs; the Kifuafua cannot refuse their counsel’.38 The
collaboration with these customary chiefs has imbued the group’s exercise
of authority with a modicum of legitimacy. Another factor in its favour is its
embeddedness in local society, which reinforces the recognition of the group
as an arme´e communautaire. As the chief ofWalowa-Loanda explained: ‘the
collaboration [with] the Mai-Mai Kifuafua is good because they are children
from the village. They can protect us; they have houses right next to us.
If I see them harassing I summon them’.39 Their collaboration with local
chiefs in the promotion of development, their participation in community
work such as salongo and other social activities, and their assistance in
vaccination campaigns illustrate both this embeddedness and the recognition
they receive from being Kifuafua members.
Yet, this embeddedness does not prevent the taxes imposed by the Kifua-
fua commanders from being experienced as a considerable burden. This is
illustrated by the frequent denunciations of the taxes by members of civil
society in Walowa-Loanda, especially those imposed at the entrance to mar-
kets. Even if some space for negotiation exists, people are still obliged to pay.
In return, they are subjected to less harassment and less random extortion,
and gain a sense of heightened community security.
The case of the Kifuafua illustrates how the continuous presence of armed
groups in Walikale and Kalehe contributes to fragmented public author-
ity. Decades of scarcity, insecurity, conflict and grievances, and the accu-
mulated fears these have produced, have allowed political-military leaders
to mobilize armed self-defence groups anchored in local forms of ethnic
38. Interview with civil society leader, Chambucha, 12 October 2015.
39. Interview with chef de groupement, Busurungi, 16 October 2015.
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citizenship. In some areas of Kalehe andWalikale, such asWalowa-Loanda,
these armed groups have become dominant public authorities, which, in re-
turn for taxes, try to enforce law and order, promote development and protect
the community.
CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we have illustrated how taxation is at the core of the
production of public authority of armed groups operating in eastern Congo.
The cases presented also show that while the wars in Kalehe and Walikale
have produced new forms of taxation, which often revolve around taxes-for-
protection arrangements, the taxation practices of contemporary Mai-Mai
groups continue, to a considerable extent, to be framed within existing
registers of authority and modes of rule, notably by re-activating ethno-
territorial ontologies of local political space, community and citizenship to
legitimize extractive taxation practices.
Taxation is one of the main activities of armed groups and one of the
most essential links between armed groups and residents. Taxes establish
mutual obligations between armed groups and residents. They are constitu-
tive for the establishment of the boundaries of the political community and
public authority. In this sense they are constitutive of both citizenship and
jurisdiction. When armed groups impose taxes on people in Walikale and
Kalehe they often justify them as obligatory contributions to the defence of
the Congolese nation state and to a given local customary community. Ev-
ery member of these imagined communities is enjoined to contribute to the
community’s defence. Armed groups frame themselves as legitimate public
authorities in these political communities because they are the only ones
with the capacity to defend them. Such discourses of community security
resonate among local populations who have been exposed to insecurity and
scarcity for decades. These imagined communities are evoked to impose
taxes, often without providing tangible public services and goods in return.
Although there is some room for negotiation, people see taxation as a heavy
burden which they cannot escape, since it is often underpinned by a more or
less open threat of force.
However, as we have argued, neither the coercive, brokered and extractive
modalities of taxation that armed groups engage in, nor the territorially bound
‘imagined communities’ (the nation state and the chiefdom) that they evoke
to legitimize these taxes suddenly appearedwhenwar broke out. Rather, they
have a long and shared history as part of the colonial language of stateness.
This implies that the fragmentation of authority which is currently taking
place in eastern Congo should not be seen as an expression of disorder. It is
the product of the very constitution of political order itself, based as it is on
territorially bound and exclusivist ethnic ontologies of local citizenship and
resource extraction.
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